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Municipal Ownership of Cable Television Systems:
Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton
The cable television industry experienced tremendous change in the 1980s
as the number of cable systems in the country doubled 1 and the industry as-

sumed a major role in mass media. 2 The nation's courts took notice of cable

television's new functions in society, acknowledging distinctions between cable

and local broadcast television 3 and adopting a heightened level of constitutional

scrutiny regarding cable regulations. 4 One circumstance that has not changed,

however, is the cable industry's dependence upon the public rights of way and

the local governments that control them. The local cable operator's dependence
on city or county government for the right to provide cable service has been a
fertile source of litigation over the past decade, 5 as many local authorities faced

for the first time the question whether to renew the contracts that brought cable
6
television to their respective areas.
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Madison Cablevision Inc. v. City of
Morganton7 saw such a franchise renewal situation take a strange turn. The
City of Morganton denied the franchise applications of three private cable operators, including the current provider, and decided to establish a municipally operated system.8 Though the event was without precedent in North Carolina,
state statutes explicitly empower municipalities 9 and counties 0 to own and op1. There were 4,048 cable systems in the United States in 1979. Zupan, The Efficacy of
Franchise Bidding Schemes in the Case of Cable Televison: Some Systematic Evidence, 32 J.L. &
EcoN. 401, 425 & n.89 (1989). By 1986 that number had risen to 7,051. Id. In 1989 there were
nearly 8.000 U.S. cable systems. Comment, ControversialProgrammingon Cable Television's Public
Access Channels. The Limits of GovernmentalResponse, 38 DE PAUL L. REv. 1051, 1056 (1989).
2. Cable television is now a twelve billion dollar per year industry. Comment, supranote 1, at
1056. It serves forty-five million subscribers. Zupan, supra note 1, at 421. A recent survey of cable
users found that roughly half had been subscribers for less than three years. R. BOWER, THE
CHANGING TELEVISION AUDIENCE IN AMERICA 61 (1985). The survey revealed that more than
half of respondents gave as their main reason for subscribing a desire for more variety. Id.
3. See infra, notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
4. See Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1169 (1986).
In recent years the lower federal courts have subjected FCC regulation of cable television
to a far more rigorous constitutional analysis [than regulation of local broadcast television].
It is now clearly established, for example, that cable operators engage in conduct protected
by the First Amendment. Most of these courts, mindful of the Supreme Court's repeated
admonitions to be sensitive to the unique features of each medium of expression, have
cautioned against reflexive invocation of more forgiving first amendment standards applicable to broadcast regulations.

Id. (citations omitted).
5. Congress codified a set of procedural guidelines in an attempt to alleviate the problem. See
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4655 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 546 (Supp. V 1987)) [hereinafter "the Cable Act"].
6. The franchise renewal provisions were a last minute addition to the Cable Act in response
to the trend of disputes arising in the early 1980s, as many cities' original fifteen- and twenty-year
franchise agreements with private cable operators expired. See Ciamporcero, Is There Any Hopefor
Cities? Recent Developments in Cable Television Law, 18 URBAN LAWYER 369, 378 (1986).
7. 325 N.C. 634, 386 S.E.2d 200 (1989).
8. Id. at 640-41, 386 S.E.2d at 204.

9. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-311(7), -312 (1987).
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erate cable television systems. This Note examines the City of Morganton's action and the statutes that authorized its actions in light of the public purpose
provisions, 1 and the exclusive emoluments and antimonopoly clauses 12 of the
North Carolina Constitution. The Note summarizes the dispute, including the
events that brought the case to the North Carolina Supreme Court. 13 The Note
then briefly analyzes the public purpose clause and the antimonopoly and exclusive emoluments clauses of the state constitution 14 through prior case law, emphasizing cable television's statutory status as a "public enterprise." Is The
background analysis traces the evolution of the cable television industry from its
origin as a rural antenna service to its present status as a multibillion dollar arm
of the mass media, with an eye to the ever-present tension between municipalities and private cable operators. 16 The Note examines the Madison court's holding and discusses the court's perception of cable television in light of
contemporary administrative and judicial views. 17 It contends that the newly
recognized free speech implications of cable television regulation clearly distinguish the industry from other commonly known public enterprises, as well as
from local broadcast television. The Note concludes that the North Carolina
Supreme Court was unduly timid in its deference to a nearly twenty-year-old
statute. The Note further concludes that the court's refusal to acknowledge
cable television's changed role in the mass media produced a counterintuitive
opinion that opens the door for entrepreneurial municipalities to enter the lucrative world of mass communications.
In October of 1966 the City of Morganton, North Carolina, granted a
franchise to privately owned Madison Cablevison, Inc. (Madison Cable).18 The
franchise agreement gave Madison Cable the right to place wires in the public
rights of way for twenty years, but also provided that upon termination of the
franchise, Madison Cable would be required to remove its wires.19 The agreement provided no right of renewal, nor any procedures for renewal. 20 The
agreement also gave the city an option to purchase the system at the end of the
10. Id. § 153A-137.
11. N.C. CONS". art. V,§ 2(1) ("The power of taxation shall be exercised in a just and equitable
manner, for public purposes only, and shall never be surrendered, suspended, or contracted away.").
12. Id. art. I, § 32 ("No person or set of persons is entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments
or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services"); id. art. I, § 34 ("Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state and shall not be allowed.").
13. See infra notes 18-49 and accompanying text.
14. Although the unfair trade practices statute, Chapter 75, is certainly relevant to these antimonopoly considerations, neither the parties nor the court in Madison Cable addressed the issue at
length, and an adequate treatment of the statute's case law would extend this analysis far beyond its
intended scope. See infra notes 191-94 and accompanying text; see also PlaintiffAppellant's Brief at
41, Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton, 325 N.C. 634, 386 S.E.2d 200 (No. 624PA87)
[hereinafter Appellant's Brief].

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-311(7) (1987); see infra notes 52-79 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 81-141 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 152-193 and accompanying text.
Madison Cable, 325 N.C. at 638-39, 386 S.E.2d at 203.
Id.
Id.
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franchise term.
Madison Cable's service offers viewers a choice of twenty-seven different
channels, including the three broadcast networks (ABC, NBC, and CBS); independent television stations; news, sports, movie, informational, and entertainment channels, including some "pay" channels; and commercial advertising
services. 22 Subscribers pay a monthly rate based upon the level of service selected. 2 3 Though Madison Cable initially provided a local public-access channel,
the service was discontinued for lack of use.24
In 1983, in anticipation of the franchise expiration in 1986, the city began
to gather information regarding the future of cable television in Morganton. 25 In
December of 1983, Madison Cable petitioned for renewal of its cable franchise,
but the city denied the request. 26 The city then commissioned an independent
consulting firm and a law firm to prepare three studies: an analysis of comparable cable system offerings, a study of local communication needs, and a feasibility study for a possible municipal system.27 The city made the results of these
studies publicly available and solicited input from the general public. The city
also solicited competing cable system proposals from Madison Cable and two
other private cable companies interested in providing service. 28 At a public hearing in November, 1984, the city provided the cable companies with an opportunity to present evidence and to question the city's consultants. 29 At trial, the city
contended that Madison Cable participated actively in these proceedings and
30
noted that Madison Cable was "very pleased with the way the meeting went."

Nearly a year later, the city council adopted an ordinance based on the
more than 1,200 page record developed in the matter, and declined to renew
Madison Cable's franchise.3 1 The city council made these conclusions:
1) [Madison Cable's] franchise should not be renewed. Within ninety
days of this Order [Madison Cable] should submit a plan for orderly
removal of its equipment from City poles at the end of the franchise
term. 2) [The other two franchise applicants] will not at this time be
granted franchises for the City of Morganton. 3) The City Staff
should begin the
steps necessary to enable the City to establish a mu32
nicipal system.
21. Id. at 639, 386 S.E.2d at 203.
22. Id. The selection also includes Cable News Network (a twenty-four hour news channel), CSPAN (which provides live coverage of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives), HBO (a pay
movie channel), the Disney Channel (a pay channel that features movies, music, cartoons and other
entertainment), and ESPN (a sports programming channel). Appellant's Brief, supra note 14, at 5.
23. Madison Cable, 325 N.C. at 639, 386 S.E.2d at 203.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 640-41, 386 S.E.2d at 203-04.
30. Defendant Appellee's New Brief at 5, Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton, 325
N.C. 634, 386 S.E.2d 200 (1989) (No. 624PA87) [hereinafter Appellees Brief].
31. Madison Cable, 325 N.C. at 640, 386 S.E.2d at 204.
32. Id. at 640-41, 386 S.E.2d at 204.
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The ordinance further stated that the possibility of another operator providing
service to the city remained a possibility but that consideration of such a possibility was unnecessary for five years. 33
The city based its decision primarily on studies by experts that showed that
while 70 percent of the city's population of roughly 14,000 subscribed to the
current service, a need existed for "a modem communications system with high
channel capacity... capable of providing diverse services and communication
opportunities to the public. ' 34 The city council determined that Madison
Cable's proposed system was not adequate to meet this need, and further, that it
was inferior to the systems proposed by the two other private applicants and to
some systems in other similar communities. 35 Finally, all parties involved in the
franchising process agreed that overbuilding 36 was infeasible, both because of
physical scarcity in the public rights of way and because of the economic im37
practicability of competition in a city of Morganton's size.
Madison Cable initially filed suit in federal court, asserting twelve claims,
38
exincluding violations of the North Carolina Constitution's public purpose,
42
41
4°
39
clauses.
expression
of
freedom
and
anti-monopoly,
clusive emoluments,
The city filed an answer and motion for summary judgment. 43 District Court
Judge Woodrow Jones dismissed the asserted Cable Act" claims because the
effective date of the provisions rendered the Act inapplicable. 45 The judge retained jurisdiction over the dispute but issued an abstention order directing
Madison Cable to submit the public purpose and antimonopoly claims to the
46
state court.
Madison Cable then filed a complaint in the Burke County superior court,
claiming violations of the public purpose and antimonopoly provisions of the
33. Id. at 641, 386 S.E.2d at 204.
34. Appellee's Brief, supra note 30, at 6. The study found a high degree of interest in the
following cable uses not provided by Madison Cable: 1) public, educational and municipal access
channels for locally produced programming; 2) local access channels to provide educational training
material to the city's employees and volunteers; 3) a Community Information Service to display
written information on local events, sevices and activities; 4) fire, security, and medical alert systems

connected to city fire and police departments; 5) energy management services; and 6) interconnection to city departments, state institutions, and schools through an institutional network. Id. at 6 n.8.
35. Id. at 7.
36. Overbuilding is the operation of additional competing systems in the city. Id.
37. Id. at 7-8.
38. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(l).
39. Id. art. I, § 32.
40. Id. art. I, § 34.
41. Id. art. I, § 14.
42. Madison Cable, 325 N.C. at 637-38, 386 S.E.2d at 201-02. The complaint also contained a
federal first amendment claim, as well as federal due process, equal protection, and Sherman Act
claims. Id. at 637, 386 S.E.2d at 202. The complaint also requested a declaratory judgment holding
that the franchise renewal process was governed by the appropriate provisions of the Cable Act. Id.
43. Id. at 638, 386 S.E.2d at 202.
44. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 521 (Supp. V 1987). The
principal aim of the Cable Act is to establish guidelines for the regulation of cable television at
various levels of government. Id. at § 521(3). See infra notes 108-18 and accompanying text for
further discussion of the Act.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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North Carolina Constitution and the unfair trade practices provisions of Chapter 75 of the North Carolina General Statutes. 47 The court ultimately granted
summary judgment in the city's favor.48 Madison Cable appealed the ruling, and
the city moved to bypass the court of appeals. The supreme court granted this
motion. 49 The court heard arguments of the parties and nineteen months later5 °
granted the city's motion for summary judgment, having found no violations of
the public purpose, antimonopoly, or exclusive emoluments clauses, or of Chap51
ter 75 of the General Statutes.
The public purpose clause of the North Carolina Constitution mandates
that the state use public funds "for public purposes only."'52 Courts have interpreted the clause to require that the activity in question be for the "benefit,
welfare, and protection" of the public.5 3 While the activity need not equally
benefit all citizens, 54 mere incidental benefits are insufficient to justify use of
public funds.55 A public purpose must have a "reasonable connection with the
convenience and necessity of the particular municipality whose aid is extended
in its promotion."'5 6 Yet the line that separates the public interest from private
interests, especially when the latter result in cognizable benefits to the public, is
57
difficult to draw.
North Carolina courts repeatedly have cited the maxim that "if there is any

restriction implied and inherent in the spirit of the American constitutions, it is
47. Id.
48. Id. In its brief Madison Cable contended that after Superior Court Judge Gaines heard oral
argument on the motions on January 26, 1987, he advised counsel that he was granting summary
judgment for plaintiff and instructed Madison Cable's counsel to draw an order to that effect. Appellant's Brief, supra note 14, at 4. Responding to a request for clarification of the ruling, on June 25,
1987, Judge Gaines stated that he was granting summary judgment for Madison Cable on the claim
that the city's entry into the cable business would violate the public purpose doctrine. Id. Because
the ruling would prohibit the city from establishing a municipal franchise, the monopoly claim was
dismissed as moot. Id. On July 6, 1987, however, without further proceedings or opportunity for
argument, Judge Gaines reversed his earlier ruling and granted summary judgment for the city. Id.
at 5.
49. Madison Cable, 325 N.C. at 638, 386 S.E.2d at 202.
50. Cases before the North Carolina Supreme Court normally spend two to three months under
advisement. Telephone interview with Greg Wallace, Clerk of Court, North Carolina Supreme
Court (Apr. 17, 1990).
51. Madison Cable, 325 N.C. at 636, 386 S.E.2d at 201.
52. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(1). Though the clause uses the language "power of taxation,"
courts have interpreted the term to mean various types of expenditures of public funds. See, eg., In
re Housing Bonds, 307 N.C. 52, 296 S.E.2d 281 (1982) (revenue bonds to finance housing for persons
of moderate income).
53. Keeter v. Town of Lake Lure, 264 N.C. 252, 264, 141 S.E.2d 634, 643 (1965). The clause
was inserted into the constitution in 1936 (previously art. V, § 3). Ch. 248, § 1 [1935] N.C. Sess.
Laws 270. The state courts, however, previously had recognized public purpose as a constitutional
limitation to the taxing power of the government. See, eg., Briggs v. Raleigh, 195 N.C. 223, 141
S.E. 597 (1928) (state fair decreed public purpose).
54. Keeter, 264 N.C. at 264, 141 S.E.2d at 643.
55. Stanley v. Department of Conservation and Development, 284 N.C. 15, 33, 199 S.E.2d 641,
653 (1973); see also Nash v. Town of Tarboro, 227 N.C. 283, 289-90, 42 S.E.2d 209, 214 (1947)
(benefits of municipal ownership and operation of hotel insufficient to justify expenditure of public
funds).
56. Keeter, 264 N.C. at 264, 141 S.E.2d at 643 (1965) (quoting Airport Auth. v. Johnson, 226
N.C. 1, 9, 36 S.E.2d 803, 809 (1945)).
57. Briggs v. Raleigh, 195 N.C. 223, 226, 141 S.E. 597, 600 (1928).
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that the government and its subdivisions shall confine themselves to the business
of government."'58 The courts, however, have refused to establish a categorical
definition of a "governmental purpose," acknowledging that our changing society causes such a definition to be constantly in flux. 59 The courts have held that
certain expenditures of tax funds for activities traditionally considered private
will satisfy the public purpose restrictions. 60 Moreover, the legislature has enumerated several nongovernmental activities (including cable television) as "public enterprises" for which public funds may be spent.6 1 The legislature also has
authorized expenditure of government funds for
communicative purposes such
62
as noncommercial public television and radio.
Though there is no standard test for what constitutes a public purpose, the
initial responsibility of making such a determination rests with the legislature.
These initial determinations, according to the supreme court, are entitled to
great weight. 63 The North Carolina Supreme Court, however, bears the ultimate
responsibility for determining whether a governmental activity serves a public
purpose. 64 Section 160A-311 of the General Statutes lists those activities that the
legislature deems to be "public enterprises," including electrical systems, water
systems, public transportation systems, waste collection and disposal systems,
off-street parking facilities, airports, and cable television systems. 65 Upon challenge of such legislative determinations of public purposes, the presumption is in
66
favor of constitutionality, and all doubts must be resolved in favor of the act.
Article I, section 34 of the North Carolina Constitution states that monopolies, being "contrary to the genius of a free state," are prohibited. This provision
often is read in conjunction with article I, section 32, which provides: "[N]o
person or set of persons is entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." '67 The
supreme court has stated that "grants of well-defined monopolistic rights to regulated quasi-public utilities, including the power of eminent domain, under the
public law, are upheld as being 'in consideration of public services.' "68 For ex58. Mitchell v. Financing Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 145, 159 S.E.2d 745, 751 (1968) (citing 38 AM.
JUR. Municipal Corporations§ 395 (1941)); see also Dennis v. Raleigh, 253 N.C. 400, 403-04, 116
S.E.2d 923, 926 (1960).
59. Mitchell, 273 N.C. at 144, 159 S.E.2d at 750.
60. See infra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-311 (1987).
62. Id. §§ 116-37.1 (television), 143B-426.12 (1987) (radio).
63. In re Housing Bonds, 307 N.C. 52, 57, 296 S.E.2d 281, 285 (1982), (quoting Mitchell v.
Housing Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 144, 159 S.E.2d 745, 750 (1968)).
64. Mitchell v. Housing Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 144, 159 S.E.2d 745, 750 (1968).
65. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-311 (1987). The legislature in 1971 enacted Article 16 (§§ 160A-

311 to -340) on public enterprises without any explanatory language in the session laws. Ch. 698, § I
[1971] N.C. Sess. Laws 770-75.
66. In re Housing Bonds, 307 N.C. 52, 57, 296 S.E.2d 281, 284 (1982).
67. See, eg., In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., 282 N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d 729

(1973) (holding that a statute requiring certificate of need from the state Medical Care Commission
in order to construct and operate a hospital on private property with private funds violated article I,
sections 32 and 34 of the North Carolina Constitution in that it granted exclusive emoluments and
established a monopoly in existing hospitals).

68. State v. Felton, 239 N.C. 575, 585, 80 S.E.2d 625, 633 (1954). Though the legislature
amended the state constitution in 1946, placing these clauses at §§ 32 and 34 of article I, the supreme
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ample, although the court has upheld governmental grants of special privileges
to railroads, 69 it also has invalidated legislation that granted an exclusive
franchise to operate a race track, based on the activity's failure to come within
the public service exception. 70 The supreme court has yet to determine whether
the benefits of cable television rise to the level of public service necessary to
satisfy the exception. The legislative determination that cable television is a
"public enterprise" 7 1 may give rise to a presumption that it constitutes a "public
service company" within the meaning of case law.72 Further, the existence of a
statute that empowers a municipality to grant cable franchises to a private com75
4
73
pany or to itself7 creates a presumption of constitutionality.
The exclusive nature of these "non-exclusive" cable franchises complicates
matters. 7 6 The law is quite clear that the constitution forbids the granting of
exclusive franchises, 77 and that the holder of a non-exclusive franchise has no
monopoly. 78 As to the nature of a particular franchise situation, courts generally
defer to municipalities; when a city has a policy of granting a single franchise,
the mere labeling of such franchise as "non-exclusive" satisfies the antimonopoly
79
clause.
North Carolina courts had not ruled on the issue of municipal franchising
of cable corporations before Madison, nor had they addressed the issue of municipal ownership of a cable system from a public purpose standpoint.80 A court
approaching such a dispute faces preliminary questions concerning the extent to
court for some time after continued to use the 1868 Constitution counterparts, referring to the exclusive emoluments clause as article I, section 7, and the antimonopoly clause as article I section 31.
See eg., id. (discussing article I section 7).
69. Reid v. Norfolk S.R.R., 162 N.C. 355, 360, 78 S.E. 306, 308 (1913) ("these franchises
granted to public service corporations come directly within the words and meaning of the

exception").
70. State v. Felton, 239 N.C. 575, 80 S.E.2d 625 (1954). Despite an agreement giving 10% of
gross receipts to the municipality, the court deemed the activity not to be "in consideration of public
service," and thus the grant of the privilege and the exclusive nature of the privilege were unconstitutional. Id. at 588, 80 S.E.2d at 635.
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-311 (1987).
72. See Reid, 162 N.C. at 359, 78 S.E. at 307-08 (1913) (court took judicial notice of legislative
act, passed subsequent to.the commencement of the dispute, which validated the disputed activity on
a public service basis).
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-319 (1987).
74. Id. § 160A-312.
75. See Town of Emerald Isle v. North Carolina, 320 N.C. 640,653,360 S.E.2d 756,764 (1987)
("The presumption is that an act passed by the Legislature is constitutional, and it must be so held
by the courts unless it appears to be in conflict with some constitutional provision." (quoting State v.
Warren, 252 N.C. 690, 696, 114 S.E.2d 660, 666 (1960)).
76. Because the city has the power to grant more than one franchise, Madison Cable's franchise
is considered "nonexclusive." As a practical matter, however, the city only issues one franchise.
77. State v. Felton, 239 N.C. 575, 582-83, 80 S.E.2d 625, 631 (1954).
78. Power Co. v. Elizabeth City, 188 N.C. 278, 124 S.E. 611 (1924).
79. See Thrift v. Elizabeth City, 122 N.C. 31, 30 S.E. 349 (1898) (execution of "exclusive"
franchise agreement enjoined); see also Durham v. North Carolina, 395 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1968) (City
of Kannapolis had policy of granting one non-exclusive franchise for operation of waterworks.).
80. But see Warner Cable Communications, Inc. v. City of Niceville, 520 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 1988)
(per curiam). In Warner Cable, a cable provider challenged the city's issuance of bonds to finance a
municipal cable system. The Florida Supreme Court held that: 1) the city had authority to issue
bonds for creation of a municipal cable system; and 2) the bonds were for a valid purpose. Id. at 246.
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which the cable industry should be subject to regulations by reason of its dependence on the public rights of way. The determination whether cable television
should be subject to strict, utility-type regulation or media-type regulation with
first amendment protection requires an inquiry into the nature of the industry
itself.
Cable television systems first appeared in the United States around 1950,
with the purpose of providing clear signals of regional broadcast television to
predominantly rural, geographically isolated communities that otherwise did not
have satisfactory reception. 8' At first, the systems carried only local broadcasting, but eventually advances in microwave technology allowed for distribution of
signals from distant stations previously unavailable to viewers. 82 The resulting
increase in viewing options created disputes between local broadcast stations and
cable operators, and governmental authorities eventually took notice of this new
83
medium.
The cable industry's unavoidable dependence on the public rights of way,
coupled with the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC) delay in firmly
asserting jurisdiction over the medium, 8 4 resulted in local governments becoming the first regulators of cable television by default. 85 Dominion over the public
streets and thoroughfares ultimately is vested in the state. Many states, including North Carolina, have enacted legislation giving cities authority to grant
franchises for cable television, 86 much the same as a municipality grants a
franchise to a public utility. Local regulation of cable television experienced an
ignominious beginning prior to FCC regulation, as collusion and graft were
81. See . Grow, Cable Television: Local Governmental Regulation in Perspective, 7 PACE L.
REV. 81, 85 (1986).
82. Id.
83. See, eg., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co,, 392 U.S. 157 (1968). This case, the first
before the Supreme Court dealing with cable television operators, arose from such adispute between
a cable operator and the owner of a television station in San Diego. Id. at 160. The station owner
complained that Southwestern Cable's transmission of signals from Los Angeles stations adversely
affected the San Diego station in a manner "inconsistent[] with the public interest." Id. The
Supreme Court, busying itself with the question of the FCC's authority to regulate such disputes
under the Communications Act of 1934, observed that cable television systems were in a period of
explosive growth, wherein what were once "no more than local auxiliariesto broadcasting" showed
promise of evolving into a "national communications system, in which signals from selected broad.
casting centers would be transmitted to metropolitan areas throughout the country." Id. at 164.
84. The Communications Act of 1934, which gave the FCC's predecessor regulatory authority
over the broadcast industry, asserts authority over only two types of communications services-

"common carriers" and "broadcasters." 47 U.S.C. §§ 151.611 (1982). Local broadcasters, reacting

to increased competition, pressed the FCC for a determination of the regulatory authority to which
the cable industry was subject. See Synchef, Municipal Ownership of Cable Television Systems, 12
U.S.F. L. REV. 205, 215-16 (1978). For nearly 10 years the FCC did not assert jurisdiction over the
industry, stating that because neither "broadcaster" nor "common carrier" properly characterized
cable television, the agency's authority was not triggered. See In re J. E. Belknap & Assocs., 18
F.C.C. 642, 643 (1954). The Commission finally reversed its position in 1962, asserting jurisdiction
over cable systems using microwave facilities. See Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C.
459, 461-62 (1962), aff'd, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
85. Synchef, supra note 84, at 207-08.
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-319 (1987). Other examples include California, CAL. GOV.
CODE § 53066 (West Supp. 1990), and New York, N.Y. EXEC. L. § 819 (West 1982). Other states
grant such power to municipalities through broad constitutional or statutory home rule powers.
E.g., CoLo. CONST., art. XX, §§ 1, 6; MICH. CONST., art. VII, § 29.
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commonplace in the franchising process.8 7
After the Supreme Court affirmed the FCC's regulatory authority over
cable television in 1968 in UnitedStates v. Southwestern Cable Co.,8 8 the agency
moved quickly to formulate a federal policy for the industry. Although in 1966
the FCC had bowed to pressure from established broadcast stations89 by imposing rules preventing cable operators from transmitting signals into the top one
hundred markets, 9° the post-Southwestern Cable regulatory climate quickly

warmed to the idea of an expanded role for cable television in the national com-

munications complex. 91 Despite this new governmental attitude, the FCC's plenary authority persisted and in several ways even increased unchecked well into
the 1970s.92 While access to the top markets began to open up, the FCC saddled
all but the smallest cable operations with duties as onerous as those imposed on
broadcasters. 93 Among these were requirements that the cable system operate
"to a significant extent as a local outlet for community expression." 94 Cable
systems also had the responsibility to comply with the equal-time provisions of
section 315 of the Communications Act,95 the sponsorship identification provisions of section 317 of the Act 96 and the fairness doctrine. 97 A 1972 agency
87. See Synchef, supra note 84, at 208-09. As an example, Synchef cited a 1971 scandal in
which a federal grand jury indicted the president of Teleprompter, Inc., a private cable company, on
charges of paying $15,000 to three public officials in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, in exchange for a
cable franchise. Id. at 208. The three officials, one of whom was the mayor, were indicted on bribery
and conspiracy charges, and all four were eventually convicted. Id. Synchef commented that "political influence appears to be necessary for an applicant to be granted a franchise." Id.
88. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
89. R.L. SMITH, THE WIRED NATION 50-51 (1972).
90. Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C. 2d 725, 782-84 (1966). This regulation, effectively
prohibiting the sale of cable television's most marketable product in the nation's top one hundred
markets (representing 89% of homes with televisions) threatened to relegate cable television permanently to its original function as a rural, ancillary television service. See P. PARSONS, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FRsT AMENDMENT 16 (1987).
91. P. PARSONS, supra note 90, at 17. The new governmental attitude was largely attributable
to the growing role of the executive branch in cable television regulation. The new focus on development of the cable industry first was enunciated by the President's Task Force on Communication
Policy. Id. (citing E. Rostow, FinalReport of the President'sTask Force on CommunicationPolicy,
(1968 Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office)).
92. The Southwestern Cable case, by characterizing the cable industry as an interstate communications facility, clearly established the FCC's broad jurisdiction to regulate the industry. 392 U.S.
at 168-69. By the late 1960s the Commission had begun to tighten its regulatory grip on cable
television. Former Republican National Committee Chairman John Burch became chairman of the
FCC in 1969, and under his leadership the Commission formulated comprehensive cable regulation
plans in December 1968 and June 1970. Synchef, supra note 90, at 224. In 1972 the Commission
modified the proposals and promulgated a set of strict regulations that, among other provisions, gave
state utility commissions jurisdiction over cable television. Cable Television Report and Order, 36
F.C.C. 2d 143 (1972); see Synchef, supra note 90, at 207.
93. J. Grow, supra note 81, at 86-88.
94. Id. at 87.
95. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982). The equal time provisions require the licensee to abstain from
affording one political candidate more broadcast opportunity than another. Congress amended this
section in 1974 expressly to include cable television systems. 47 U.S.C. § 315(c) (1982) (definitions).
(Cable television is often referred to, as in the Act, as community antenna television systems
(CATV)).
96. 47 U.S.C. § 317(a)(1) (1982). The sponsorship identification provisions require that parties
who pay for broadcasting must be identified as having done so simultaneously with such broadcast.
The language in the statute applies to radio broadcasting, but says nothing about cable television.
97. J. Grow, supra note 81 at 87-88. "The fairness doctrine imposes a twofold duty upon
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rulemaking promulgated a comprehensive regulatory package, which required
cable operations to provide free access channels for use by the general public,
local government, and local educational institutions.9" While explicitly recognizing that cable was by nature distinct from broadcasters and common carriers, 99
the FCC nevertheless continued to exercise rigid authority over the medium in a
manner virtually identical to its regulation of broadcast television. 100
Cable television is subject to regulation by two levels of government, The
initial justification for local regulation was government control of the public
rights of way. 10 1 The FCC clarified the role of local government in its 1972 rule,
giving governments much the same authority as that normally exercised in
granting franchises for public utilities: 1) franchisee selection; 2) determination
of franchise duration; 3) rate regulation; 4) oversight of franchisee's subscriber
grievance procedure; and 5) determination of service area. 10 2 Federal regulation
is predicated upon the government's asserted exclusive jurisdiction over broadcasting. 10 3 This governmental regulation of constitutionally protected media of
expression is justified in light of the physical limitations on the number of signals
that broadcasters can transmit simultaneously over the electromagnetic spectrum, a theory known as the "scarcity rationale."10' 4 The tremendous growth of
the cable television industry starting in the late 1970s caused governments to
reconsider these bases of jurisdiction on both the local and federal levels, as well
as many of the regulations spawned by this authority.
One writer characterized cable television from its inception until 1984 as
"the neglected stepchild of federal communications law."' 0' 5 Indeed, the Communications Act of 1934,106 which regulated the communications industry,
never contemplated television, much less its distribution via cable. By the late
1970s courts were becoming more receptive to the cable industry's use of the
first amendment as a tool for relief from burdensome regulation on both local
broadcasters. First, a licensee is required to devote a reasonable amount of time to the coverage of
controversial issues of public importance. Second, a licensee must provide a reasonable opportunity
for the presentation of contrasting points of view." Id. at 88 n.33. The FCC no longer supports the
fairness doctrine. Report and Order, 102 F.C.C. 2d 143, 147 (1985).
98. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C. 2d 143, 190-91 (1972).

99. Id. at 211 ("We reatr

our view that cable systems are neither broadcasters nor common

carriers within the meaning of the Communications Act. Rather, cable is a hybrid that requires

identification as a separate force in communications."). Despite the lack of "broadcaster" or "common carrier" basis for jurisdiction, the Supreme Court already had upheld the FCC's authority over
cable as "reasonably ancillary" to its broadcast television responsibilities. United States v. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).
100. See, eg., Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d at 190-91 ("It has long been a

Commission objective to foster local service in broadcasting. To this end we have encouraged the
grcwth of UHF television, and have looked to all broadcast stations to provide community-oriented
programming. We expect no less of cable.")
101. Synchef, supra note 84, at 208.
102. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C. 2d at 207.

103. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303 (1982).
104. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212-13 (1943). Government
licensing and regulatory authority over broadcasting is "attributable to certain basic facts about
radio as a means of communication-its facilities are limited; they are not available to all who may
wish to use them; the radio spectrum simply is not large enough to accomodate everybody." Id.

105. Ciamporcero, supra note 6, at 370.
106. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-610 (1982).
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and federal levels.107
In 1984 Congress finally brought communications legislation up-to-date
with respect to cable by the passage of the Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984108 (hereinafter "Cable Act"). The principal aim of the Cable Act is to
establish guidelines for the regulation of cable television at the various levels of
government. 1' 9 Among its most significant provisions is a comprehensive municipal franchising scheme, which comprises the primary means of cable television regulation. 110 It provides for eventual deregulation of franchisor rate
regulation in competitive markets,"' as well as restrictions on facilities and
equipment that a municipality may require in the franchising process. 1 2 However, the Cable Act still allows the franchising authority to limit franchise
awards to one vendor 1 3 and to prohibit a cable operator from providing service
without the grant of a franchise.114 The Cable Act also permits any state or
franchising authority to hold any or all of the ownership interest in any cable
system." 5 In this "legislative compromise," 11 6 the cable industry finally obtained a much-awaited legislative mandate, while municipal advocates avoided

(for the time being, at least) what they perceived as an FCC no longer sympa-

thetic to their claims. 117 Since its enactment, the Cable Act has been assaulted
on constitutional grounds in the federal courts, 1 18 calling into question Con107. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S.
829 (1977). Home Box Office contested several FCC rules that limited the programming operators
could offer on a pay basis, the FCC's premise having been that such programming coujd eventually
lead to a dilution of free television offerings, a result not in the public interest. Id. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit struck down the regulations as overreaching on the part
of the FCC and a violation of the first amendment rights of cablecasters. Id. at 49. One commentator has stated that the case
elevated [cable television] out of its twenty five year status as an auxiliary service. It appeared to give cable First Amendment standing equal to that of the print media. In fact,
the test finally used by the court to determine the legitimacy of governmental intervention
here was drawn from the symbolic speech case [U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968].
PARSONS, supra note 90, at 63.
108. 47 U.S.C. § 521 (Supp. V 1987).
109. Id. § 521(3).
110. H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 19, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4656 [hereinafter cited as 1984 HousE REP.].
111. 47 U.S.C. § 543 (Supp. V 1987). See 1984 HOUSE REP.,supra note 110, at 65-68, reprinted
in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws at 4702-05.
112. 47 U.S.C. § 544 (Supp. V 1987). See 1984 HousE REP., supra note 110, at 68-70, reprinted
in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS at 4705-07.
113. 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (Supp. V 1987). See 1984 HOUSE REP., supra note 110, at 59, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4696.
114. 47 U.S.C. § 541 (b)(1) (Supp. V 1987). See 1984 HOUSE REP., supra note 110, at 59, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS at 4696.
115. 47 U.S.C. § 533(e) (Supp. V 1987); see 1984 HOUSE REP., supranote 110, at 18, reprintedin
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws at 4649.
116. J. GOODALE, ALL ABOUT CABLE, § 2.02[3] (Supp. 1989).
117. Id.
118. See, eg., Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (FCC cannot require
cable operators to carry all local broadcast channels), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986); Tele-Communications of Key West v. United States, 757 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (court uses public forum
doctrine to determine rights of cable operators); Preferred Communications, Inc. v City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985) (city cannot limit issuance of cable franchises if utility poles
have physical capacity to accomodate more lines), aff'd, 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
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gress's perception of today's cable industry relative to other bodies of the mass
media.
By the mid-1980s the cable industry was challenging the constitutionality of
nearly every form of cable regulation.119 One of these challenges, Preferred
Communicationsv. City ofLos Angeles, 120 produced a ruling that "struck at the
heart of the Cable Act." 121 PreferredCommunications grew out of a cable company's attempt to establish a system in south-central Los Angeles without a
franchise grant from the city. 122 When the public utility would not allow the
company to string wires without a city permit, the cable company challenged the
entire franchising process in court. 12 3 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that the district court's dismissal of the claim was in
error. 124 The Ninth Circuit decided that the city's policy of limiting one
franchise per service area regardless of whether the utility poles were physically
capable of accommodating others violated the first amendment. 125 The court
expressly rejected the city's demand for application of the first amendment review standard normally applied to broadcasting regulation, concluding that the
126
apparent similarity between cable and broadcast television is "superficial"
and citing precedent mandating that "[e]ach medium of expression ... be assessed for first amendment purposes by standards suited to it.' ' 127 The court of
appeals then rejected seriatim each of the city's grounds for application of lenient first amendment review, including the "physical scarcity" rationale 128 and
the natural monopoly or "economic scarcity" rationale.1 29 The court went on to
reject the city's argument that there is a government interest in regulating private disruption of the public domain, reasoning that such a concern was insufficient to justify a government grant of monopoly.1 30 The court of appeals refused
to rule on the constitutionality of the Cable Act, but in a footnote observed that
"the mandatory access and leased access requirements contained in the city's
franchising scheme and called for by [the Cable Act] pose particularly troubling
constitutional questions," concluding that "[i]mposing access requirements on
119. See infra, notes 121-41 and accompanying text.
120. Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985),
aff'd, 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
121. P. PARSONS, supra note 90, at 72.
122. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1400.
123. Id. at 1400-01.
124. Id. at 1415.
125. Id. at 1411.
126. Id. at 1403.
127. Id. (citing Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975).
128. Id. at 1403-04 ("[A]n essential precondition of [broadcast] theory-physical interference
and scarcity requiring an umpiring role for government-is absent." (citation omitted)). For discussion of the scarcity rationale, see supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
129. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1404.05. The court actually refused to rule on this issue, being
bound to accept as true Preferred's allegation that competition between cable services in the Los
Angeles area was economically feasible. Id. at 1404. The court did cite some cases that had concluded that such natural monopoly characteristics might justify "some degree" of governmental
regulation. Id. at 1405.

130. Id. at 1405-07.
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the press would no doubt be invalid." 13 1
The Supreme Court's ruling in Preferred did not follow the lower court's
lead in extending constitutional protection to cable. Significantly, however, the
Court acknowledged for the first time that the cable industry enjoyed some measure of first amendment standing. 132 Although the Court recognized cable television as an autonomous medium and stated that the first amendment gave the
plaintiff cable operator certain rights, it declined to identify those rights. 133 One
writer has observed that "in fact, the Court appeared to be reaching out for
134
guidance about the nature of the cable communications medium.
The ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Tele-CommunicationsofKey West v. United States,135 is of practical importance. The dispute arose out of a franchising process in which the
established cable provider, seeking franchise renewal, was dropped in favor of
another company. 13 6 The court of appeals reversed the lower court's dismissal,
based on the public forum doctrine of first amendment jurisprudence. The doctrine holds that property historically open to the public and available to anyone

for use as a forum for exercise of first amendment rights constitutes an unconditional public forum. 137 The opinion, written by Judge Skelly Wright, warily applied the public forum analysis, stating that this new context requires more care
than traditional arms of the media in deciding which first amendment analytical
approach to apply. 138
Three months later Judge Wright wrote another opinion for the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit which invalidated
long-standing FCC rules that required cable operators to carry all stations operating in or near their market. 139 The court in Quincy Cable TV v. FCC was
concerned with federal cable regulation, thereby mandating a different analysis
from that used to determine local regulatory validity. 14° The ruling, however,
131. Id. at 1401 n.4.
132. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986) ("We do
think that the activities in which respondent allegedly seeks to engage plainly implicate First
Amendment interests.")
133. Id. at 496-97 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
134. P. PARSONS, supra note 90, at 73.
135. 757 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
136. Id. at 1332-33.
137. Id. at 1337. Traditional public forums include streets and parks. See, eg., United States v.
Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983). Places traditionally considered not open to public expression include
restricted access military bases, see Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976), and intraschool mailboxes,
see Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). Again, the public
forum doctrine is not so important to this discussion as is the emerging pervasiveness of first amendment considerations in cable franchising disputes.
138. Tele-Communications, 757 F.2d at 1339.
139. Quincy Cable TV v. F.C.C., 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169
(1986). The plaintiffs in Quincy were a local cable operator, Quincy Cable T.V., and a satellite cable
programmer, Turner Broadcasting. The "must carry" rules limited the satellite programming
Quincy could carry, thus injuring both carrier and programmer. Id. at 1437-38. This is the same
court that handed down the decision in Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). See supra note 107 for discussion of Home Box Office.
140. For example, the public forum doctrine is not relevant in considering FCC regulatory
actions.
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sheds some light on the continued viability of certain aspects of local regulation
with respect to the changing judicial perception of cable television. The most
important aspect of the ruling is the court's novel suggestion that the "economic
scarcity" or "natural monopoly" rationale may be groundless:
[T]he "economic scarcity" argument rests on the entirely unprovenand indeed doubtful-assumption that cable operators are in a position
to exact monopolistic charges. Moreover, the tendency toward monopoly, if present at all, may well be attributable more to governmental
action-particularly the municipal franchising process-than to any
"natural" economic phenomenon. In any case, whatever the outcome
of the debate over the monopolistic characteristics of cable, the
Supreme Court has categorically rejected the suggestion that purely
economic constraints on the number of voices available in a given comotherwise unwarranted intrusions into First Amendmunity justify
14 1
ment rights.
The Quincy decision, like the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Preferred three
months earlier, raises serious questions about the validity of governmental regulation of cable on both the local level and within the ambit of the Cable Act. It
clearly echoes the message that cable television is not in the same first amendment category as broadcast television, 142 and that regulation based on any scarcity theory is suspect. 143

Thus, the Madison question as to the validity of municipal ownership of a
cable television system arose in an environment increasingly hostile toward government involvement in the industry. The cable lobby, victorious in its push for
judicial recognition of the distinction between cable television and broadcast television, asserts that its industry deserves the same first-amendment protections
as the print media. 144 As courts move toward this view and content regulation
in the franchising process becomes unfashionable, if not impossible, familiar
questions begin to arise concerning cable's unavoidable dependence on the public domain. These questions, going beyond content to the structural regulation
of cable, arose in the germinal stages of the industry. 145 In light of the changed
nature of cable and the new, ubiquitous considerations of freedom of expression,
141. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1450 (citing Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
247-256 (1974) (other citations omitted)).

142. Id. at 1448.
143. Id. at 1448-50. See also Ciamporcero, supra note 6, at 388. ("While the cities may be better

able than the FCC to pursue successfully some variant of the physical scarcity rationale, the courts
will be skeptical."). Another commentator has concluded:
In Quincy ... a number of rationales historically used to justify government control of
cable were addressed and found insufficient. While the case dealt with only one form of

regulation, the logic permeated the framework of FCC authority over cable. Extending the
argument of the court in Quincy, one could call into question much of the [Cable Act]
itself. It seemed possible after the case that if a challenge to the act arose within the jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit, that body would have little hesitation in finding the new law, or
parts of it, unconstitutional.
P. PARSONS, supra note 90, at 72.
144. P. PARsoNs, supra note 90, at 111.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
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these questions, for years easily answered by statute or case law, must be asked
anew.
The issue of municipal ownership of cable television systems historically
has not been a source of controversy to the FCC.14 6 It is expressly allowed by
federal and some state statutes.' 47 A 1980 survey of the twenty-eight cities with
municipally owned systems revealed that the cities' reasons for entering the industry varied according to the year of entry.148 The earliest systems belonged to
the most isolated communities that, without cable, lacked clear reception.1 4 9
Later systems belonged to those communities that failed to attract private companies.150 The survey cited additional factors as including 1) a desire to provide
the service to local citizens; 2) a desire to control the cable system directly; or 3)
a desire to benefit directly from cable television revenue.' 5 '
Among the most important legal issues concerning municipal ownership is
whether government, to the exclusion of private enterprise, should engage in a
business which is not a practical necessity. 152 Another question is whether the
dangers of government control of a powerful medium of communication outweigh the financial and convenience benefits of local ownership 5 3. These questions faced the North Carolina Supreme Court as it approached the Madison
Cable dispute.
Justice Meyer's opinion, representing a unanimous court, began by noting
that although Madison Cable had filed a claim in the federal suit based on freedoms of speech and press under Article I, section 14 of the state constitution, it
was unclear whether this issue was presented to the state court. l5 4 The court
acknowledged that Madison Cable repeatedly referred to the state free-speech
clause in its arguments concerning the public purpose and monopoly issues, but
concluded that because a violation of the free-speech clause was not specifically
alleged or separately briefed by Madison Cable, the opinion would not address
the issue.155 The court went further, however, and in a statement of crucial importance to the case, ruled that no analysis of the state freedom of speech provision was necessary to determine whether establishment of a mhunicipally owned
cable system violates the public purpose and the exclusive emoluments and priv146. See, eg., City of Valparaiso, 61 F.C.C.2d 328, 330 (1976) ("mT7he Commission has never
either favored or opposed municipal ownership of cable television. Indeed, municipally affiliated
cable systems have existed for almost two decades, and the Commission was well aware of their
existence when it adopted the Cable Television Report and Order.").
147. Eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-311, 312 (1987); 47 U.S.C. § 553(e) (Supp. V 1987).

148. D. MacKenna, The Cabling of America: What About Municipal Ownership?, 70 NAT'L

Civic REV. 307, 310-12 (1981) (citing BROADCASTMNG YEARBOOK 1980, Broadcasting Publications,
Inc., Washington, D.C.). The populations of these cities varied from 126 in Boaz, Wisconsin, to
41,500 in San Bruno, California. Id. at 311.
149. Id. at 311-12.
150. Id. at 312.
151. Id.
152. Synchef, supra note 84, at 205.
153. See id. at 242.
154. Madison Cable, 325 N.C. at 642, 386 S.E.2d at 204-05.
155. Id. at 642, 386 S.E.2d at 205.
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ileges clauses of the state constitution. 156
The court granted great deference to the fact that the North Carolina legislature has explicitly authorized municipalities to establish, own and operate
cable television systems.15 7 The court cited its most recent public purpose ruling, In re HousingBonds, 158 in laying the groundwork for scrutinizing the constitutionality of the public enterprise statute, stating that the legislature's
determination creates a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of the
act.' 59 The amicus brief ified on plaintiff's behalf directed the court's attention
to the encroachment on freedom of expression effected by such a statute.160 The
argument stated that "when courts review the constitutionality of state laws or
local ordinances that impose restraints on freedom of expression, they should be
less deferential toward legislatures and city councils than when less fundamental
rights are at stake." 161 The argument continued: "Government control of busi-

ness operations must be most closely scrutinized when it affects communication
of information and ideas, and prior restraints in those circumstances are presumptively invalid."' 162
The court, however, refused to apply these freedom of expression considerations to the case and accepted the city's argument that the "public" nature of
cable systems' function casts doubts upon any purely private characterizations
of the industry. 163 The city contended that cable systems receive "special privileges" by way of their franchise agreements which allow them access to public
rights of way "in consideration for the promise to provide public services," and
thus are imbued with characteristics similar to public utilities. 164
The court's determination of the characteristics of a public purpose largely
agreed with the city's public utility characterization. 165 Madison Cable had
contended that the determination should be based upon a three-part inquiry:
"1) Is the activity one traditionally performed by the government? 2) Is there a
public need for the activity? and 3) Is private enterprise unwilling or unable to
156. Id.

157. Id. at 643-45, 386 S.E.2d at 205-06; see N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-311 (defining cable
television as a public enterprise); 160A-312 (authorizing city ownership of public enterprises); 160A-

319 (authorizing cities to grant franchises for public enterprises).
158. 307 N.C. 52, 296 S.E.2d 281 (1982).
159. Madison Cable, 325 N.C. at 645, 386 S.E.2d at 206 (quoting In re Housing Bonds, 307 N.C.

52, 57, 296 S.E.2d 281, 284 (1982) ("The Constitution is a restriction of powers and those powers not
surrendered are reserved to the people to be exercised through their representatives in the General
Assembly; therefore, so long as an act is not forbidden, the wisdom and expediency of the enactment
is a legislative, not a judicial, decision.")).
160. Amici Curiae Brief (Newspaper, Broadcast and Cable Associations) at 9, Madison Cablevlsion, Inc. v. City of Morganton, 325 N.C. 634, 386 S.E.2d 200 (1989) (No 624PA87).

161. Id.
162. Id. (citing Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
163. Appellees Brief, supra note 30, at 29-30.
164. Id. at 30 (citing Shaw v. Asheville, 269 N.C. 90, 152 S.E.2d 139 (1967); Kornegay v. City of
Raleigh, 269 N.C. 155, 152 S.E.2d 186 (1967) (holding that the franchise granted to cable systems is
not available to all, and hence is subject to reasonable public interest obligations to ensure that the

public's interest in the rights of way is protected)).
165. Madison Cable, 325 N.C. at 646-53, 386 S.E.2d at 207-11.

1990]

MEDIA LAW

engage in the activity?" ' 166 Unless all three questions are answered affirmatively,
Madison Cable had asserted, the activity cannot be viewed as having a public
purpose. 167 Madison Cable had based the test in part on a 1973 supreme court
decision, stating "it is only when private enterprise has demonstrated its inability or unwillingness to meet a public necessity that government is permitted to
invade the private sector." 168 This language so troubled the court that it took
pains to refute the passage as "an aberration" that "must be considered dictum
which did not create a rule of decision for future cases." 169 The court held that if
indeed this were the test of a public purpose, many, if not most of the services
traditionally provided by municipalities under the public purpose doctrine
170
would be subject to challenge on constitutional grounds.
Thus, the court decided the issue under principles traditionally used for
determining that a municipality's activity is for a public purpose. The public
purpose requirement is met if the activity involves a reasonable connection with
the convenience and necessity of the particular municipality, 171 and benefits the
public generally, as opposed to special interests or persons.' 72 The court then
cited a plethora of prior decisions in which the government action met the

"traditional test" and competed with private businesses furnishing the same service, including aid to railroad; 173 airport facilities; 174 a grain-handling facility
financed by revenue bonds and to be leased to a private concern; 175 low and
177
moderate income housing; 176 and purchase of a lake and generating plant.

Finally, the court addressed the communicative aspect of cable television as a
public enterprise, drawing parallels between city-owned cable television systems
and public radio and television stations owned and operated by the state. The

court concluded that invalidating the legislative authorization for municipal
ownership of cable systems would call into question the constitutionality of the
statutes authorizing public television and radio.' 78 On these bases, the court

ruled that the municipal operation and ownership of a cable television system
166. Id. at 646, 386 S.E.2d at 207.

167. Id.
168. Id. at 647, 386 S.E.2d at 207 (quoting Stanley v. Department of Conservation and Dev., 294
N.C. 15, 33, 199 S.E.2d 641, 653 (1973)).
169. Id. at 648, 386 S.E.2d at 208.
170. Id. at 647, 386 S.E.2d at 207. The opinion stated:
Despite the fact that privately owned utilities stand ready and willing to serve municipal
residents, no one would seriously argue that this fact alone renders the provision of electric
service a private, rather than a public, purpose. The same holds true for public hospitals,
waste disposal, and other similar services.
Id. at 647, 386 S.E.2d at 207-08.
171. Id. at 646, 386 S.E.2d at 207 (citing Airport Auth. v. Johnson, 226 N.C. 1, 36 S.E.2d 803
(1946)).
172. Id. (citing Martin v. Housing Corp., 277 N.C 29, 175 S.E.2d 665 (1970)).
173. Id. at 649, 386 S.E.2d at 209 (citing Wood v. Town of Oxford, 97 N.C. 227, 2 S.E. 653
(1887)).
174. Id. (citing Airport Auth. v. Johnson, 226 N.C. 1, 36 S.E.2d 803 (1946)).
175. Id. (citing Ports Auth. v. Trust Co., 242 N.C. 416, 88 S.E.2d 109 (1955)).
176. Id. at 650, 386 S.E.2d at 209 (citing Martin v. Housing Corp., 277 N.C. 29, 175 S.E.2d 665
(1970); In re Housing Bonds, 307 N.C. 52, 296 S.E.2d 281 (1982)).
177. Id. (citing Keeter v. Town of Lake Lure, 264 N.C. 252, 141 S.E.2d 634 (1965)).
178. Id. at 651-52, 386 S.E.2d at 210-11. "Our examination of statutes enacted by our General
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was reasonably related to the convenience and necessity of the city and a benefit
to the public generally so as to constitute a "public purpose" within the meaning
of the state constitution.

17 9

Madison Cable had contended that, even assuming that cable television
constitutes a public purpose, and conceding that by reason of statute and use of
public rights of way the city has the power to regulate a business or occupation,
this does not necessarily include the power to exclude persons from engaging in
those activities. 180 Madison Cable then called attention to the state's "constitutional bias in favor of competition,"' 18 1 which is reflected in both constitutional
and statutory language.18 2 Madison Cable finally argued that because the activity in question is a constitutionally protected exercise of the freedom of expression, the city is precluded from designating itself a monopoly provider, just as it
would be precluded from assuming sole control over the distribution of print
media or broadcast television transported over Morganton's public rights of
way 183

The court summarily rejected each of these constitutional and statutory arguments. 184 The opinion first noted that the city expressly had not foreclosed
the possibility of granting a franchise to another operator, and the fact that the
city would not approach such a decision for another five years did not warrant
classification of the city as the "exclusive provider" of cable services.' 8 5 Further,
the court cited precedent holding that when a city grants a non-exclusive
franchise to another party "it is18not
a monopoly within the meaning of the gen6
eral constitutional prohibition."
The court rejected Madison Cable's exclusive emoluments claim by noting
that the cable arrangement contemplated does not constitute a "franchise," in
that a city needs no grant from itself to engage in activities classified as "public
enterprises."'18 7 Thus, in the court's view, what Madison Cable considered a
grant of an exclusive privilege was not a grant at all, but a mere exercise of
authority granted to the city by the legislature.18 8 The court further pointed out
that because such exclusive privileges may be granted "in consideration of public
Assembly reveals a clear legislative intent and expression of the public policy of this state to
public ownership and operation of both radio and television." Id. at 652, 386 S.E.2d at 211.

foster

179. Id at 653, 386 S.E.2d at 211.
180. Appellant's Brief, supra note 14, at 40 (citing State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 759, 6 S.E.2d

854, 863 (1939)).
181. Id. at 41.
182. Id. at 36, 41. Article I, § 34 of the North Carolina Constitution provides: "[Mjonopolies

are contrary to the genius of a free state and shall not be allowed." N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 34. Article
I, § 32 provides: "[N]o person or set of persons is entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or
privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." Id. art. I, § 32. Chapter 75
of the General Statutes prohibits unreasonable restraints of trade, unfair competition, price fixing,

and price discrimination. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1 to -5 (1988).
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Appellant's Brief, supra note 14, at 43.
Madison Cable, 325 N.C. at 653-55, 386 S.E.2d at 211-12.
Id. at 654, 386 S.E.2d at 211.
Id. at 654, 386 S.E.2d at 212 (citing Thrift v. Elizabeth City, 122 N.C. 31, 30 S.E. 349

(1898)).
187. Id.
188. Id.
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services," the operation of a cable system fits directly into the constitutional
exception.18 9 Finally, the court held that the constitutional provision was not
designed to prevent the community from exercising powers legislatively granted,
but rather to prevent the community from surrendering such power to another
exclusively in absence of consideration of public services. 190
The court finally considered the applicability of the unfair trade practices
provisions of Chapter 75 of the North Carolina General Statutes, holding that
[b]ecause cities are authorized to own and operate cable systems and to
prohibit others from doing so without a franchise and are not required
to issue franchises, it is clear that the legislature contemplated that
there would be situations where private corporations would be displaced by municipal cable systems which would operate without competing franchises being issued. 19 1
The court concluded that such anticompetitive conduct, which the legislation
192
contemplates, should not be subject to attack under the state's antitrust laws.
The court further concluded that because the issues presented were purely legal,
the trial judge did not err in granting the city's motion for summary judgment. 193 Meanwhile, Madison Cable continued to provide service to the City of
194
Morganton pending the outcome of litigation on the issues in federal court.
The North Carolina Supreme Court's refusal to consider freedom of expression implications in its analyses of the public purpose and antimonopoly issues
led to a counterintuitive ruling that allows for entrepeneurial, yet inexperienced,
municipalities to displace established cable operations in hopes of increasing city
revenues. It is a basic tenet of our law that a constitutional provision does not
operate in a vacuum, isolated from other constitutional concerns. 195 The fact
that Madison Cable did not transfer its freedom of expression claim from federal
to state court should not preclude consideration of the implications of the constitutional provision with regard to the other claims. Madison Cable discussed the
freedom of expression issue in its brief in both the public purpose and antimonopoly arguments. The court's failure to consider the issue ignores the current
nature of cable television as an important arm of the mass media.
189. Id. See supra note 182 for the constitutional text.

190. Madison Cable, 325 N.C. at 655, 386 S.E.2d 212.
191. Id. at 655-56, 386 S.E.2d at 212-13.
192. Id. at 656-57, 386 S.E.2d at 213.
193. Id. at 657-58, 386 S.E.2d at 214.
194. Id at 639, 386 S.E.2d at 203.
195. See State v. Emery, 224 N.C. 581, 583, 31 S.E.2d 858, 860 (1944):
The will of the people as expressed in the Constitution is the Supreme Law of the land. In
searching for this will or intent all cognate provisions are to be brought into view in their
entirety and so interpreted as to effectuate the manifest purposes of the instrument.
Id. See also Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920):
The necessities which gave birth to the Constitution, the controversies which preceded its
formation, and the conflicts of opinion which were settled by its adoption, may properly be
taken into view for the purpose of tracing to its source any particular provision of the
Constitution, in order thereby to be enabled to correctly interpret its meaning.' This sound
rule is as applicable to the amendments as to the provisions of the original Constitution.
Id. at 259-60 (quoting Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 95 (1900)).
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The North Carolina Supreme Court, in Martin v. Housing Corp., stated:
A slide rule definition to determine public purpose for all time cannot
be formulated; the concept expands with the population, economy, scientific knowledge, and changing conditions. As people are brought
closer together in congested areas, the public welfare requires governmental operation of facilities which were once considered exclusively
private enterprises, and necessitates the expenditure of tax funds
for
96
purposes which, in an earlier day, were not classified as public.'
Yet in Madison Cablevision, the converse of this statement should apply. The
cable television industry has changed in the past twenty years from an auxilliary
conduit of broadcast television providing rural areas clear reception of local signals to a leading medium for197the dissemination of ideas with widely recognized
first amendment protection.
Although the court stated that Madison Cable's proposed public purpose
test would call into question the authority of municipalities to construct, own,
operate, or regulate those public enterprises in which private companies sought
to do business,'19 the court's own public purpose test would allow government
to operate nearly any business. Government-run supermarkets or hardware
stores, one may reasonably conclude, meet the traditional test in that they "bear
a connection with the convenience and necessity of a particular municipality,
199
while benefitting the public generally."'
The court's analogy to public television in support of its public purpose
conclusion 2°° actually supports Madison Cable's proposed test,20 1 in that public
television is noncommercial 20 2 and nonprofit oriented. Public television serves
its mission of "enhancing the uses of television for public purposes" 20 3 by offering programming eschewed by commercial broadcasters. Further, North Carolina Public Television does not operate to the exclusion of putative competitors.
The supreme court's opinion ignores practical reality in deferring to ' the
'2 °4
municipality's categorization of its own franchise as "non-exclusive.
Although Madison Cable's twenty-year "non-exclusive" franchise was no less
illusory, that situation at least involved a franchisor and a franchisee dealing at
arms' length. To assume either situation, however, is to beg the increasingly
asked question: Is municipal regulation of cable television necessary or even
desirable? While federal courts become less and less inclined to assume such a
necessity, 20 5 municipal advocates continue to justify such regulation with the
natural monopoly argument. 20 6 The natural monopoly justification, however,
196.
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200.
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Martin v. Housing Corp., 277 N.C. 29, 43, 175 S.E.2d 665, 672 (1970) (citations omitted).
See supra notes 119-41 and accompanying text.
Madison Cable, 325 N.C. at 648, 386 S.E.2d at 208.
Id. at 646, 386 S.E.2d at 207.
Id. at 651-52, 386 S.E.2d at 210-11.
See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-37.1(a) (1987).

Id.
Madison Cable, 325 N.C. at 654, 386 S.E.2d at 211-12.
See supra notes 119-141 and accompanying text.
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has become increasingly discredited in the communications industry. 20 7
The court's classification of cable television as a "public service" satisfying
the exception to article I, section 32 of the North Carolina Constitution is not
supported by reasoning, but rather is based on a legislative determination that
cable television is a "public service company. ' 20 8 To this end, inasmuch as the
supreme court relied upon cable television's statutory status as a public enterprise in supporting its holdings based upon the public purpose and antimonopoly and exclusive emoluments clauses, it failed to recognize the real cable
industry that exists outside of the statute. The statute that designates cable television as a public enterprise came into being in 1971,209 a time when cable operators made virtually no editorial decisions and the cable industry largely was
confined to "remote communities where traditional antenna based systems
would not provide satisfactory reception. ' 210 Municipal advocates freely admit
that financial concerns are one driving force behind the establishment of municipal systems today, especially following the displacement of the previous
franchise holder. 2 11 Yet the municipalities reap these revenues at the expense of
widely recognized freedom of expression rights.
Indeed, even after having determined that cable television met the judicial
"public purpose test," the court should have concluded that an activity cannot
constitute a "public purpose" if it is unconstitutional. Despite a proposed activity's facial compliance with judicially set criteria, the fact that such an activity
abrogates fundamental liberty interests should prevail over nonconstitutional
concerns. In light of the fundamental rights at stake in the Madison Cable dispute, the court should have applied a strict scrutiny test of constitutionality to
the public enterprise statute in question. Because government ownership of
cable television can hardly be said to serve a compelling government interest,
under strict scrutiny the court would have declared the city's proposed activity
unlawful.
The supreme court's failure to distinguish between sewer systems or even

libraries and the cable television systems of today leads to a conclusion that the
Madison Cable opinion is an example of timid judicial deference to an outdated
statute. The situation in Madison Cable might be analogized to that of a dissatisfied government seizing control of a city's only newspaper and operating a
municipal newspaper while excluding all competitors. This analogy is not as
outlandish as one at first might think. Both are media that disseminate information into the marketplace of ideas. The courts have recognized both as meriting
first amendment protection. Both rely on the public rights of way for the distri207. See, eg., Hazlett, The Policy of Exclusive Franchisingin Cable Television, 31 J. BROAD& ELECTRONIC MEDIA 1 (1987) (attacking natural monopoly justification for local regula-
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tion of cable television on both economic and political grounds).
208. Mladison Cable, 325 N.C. at 654, 386 S.E.2d at 212.
209. Ch. 698, § 1 [1971] N.C. Sess. Laws 770-75 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-311
(1987)).
210. D. MacKenna, supra note 148, at 307.
211. Id. ("As local officials become more concerned about financial stability, they may be overlooking [cable television], which is not only in demand in many communities but also is recognized
as extremely lucrative by the investment community.").
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bution of their product. One of these situations is forbidden by the first amendment and the North Carolina Constitution. The other is allowed by statute.
EDWARD HARDY LEWiS

